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I develop a dynamic model to examine how financial constraints and competition affect
firms’ research and development (R&D) strategies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I show
that financially constrained firms can optimally invest more intensively in R&D projects than
unconstrained firms. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money
before its ongoing R&D project bears fruit, which forces the firm to abandon the project. For
firms that rely on risky cash flows to keep their R&D projects alive, early success can be rela-
tively important. When the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“acceler-
able” R&D), a financially constrained firmmay find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise
the probability of project survival. Moreover, when firms with different financial constraints
compete in an R&D race, their strategic interactions lead to an unconstrained firm having a
hump-shaped response of investment rate against its constrained competitor. As a result, a
constrained firm can preempt its unconstrained competitor in market equilibrium. The model
also generates new testable implications regarding how project characteristics and cash flow
risks impact R&D decisions.
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1. Introduction
Research and development (“R&D”) investment is an important corporate decision. Unlike
traditional corporate investment, R&D projects often take years, if not decades, before bearing
the fruits of innovation. The maturity uncertainty associated with the long investment horizon
and the innate technical risk make R&D decisions more complex, even without any real world
friction acting as the “Sword of Damocles”. This challengemay explainwhy the following question
remains open: How do financial constraints and competition affect firms’ R&D decisions?
My goal in this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing firms’ R&D decisions
in the presence of financing frictions and innovation competition. I focus my analysis on the cor-
porate decision of R&D investment per period, which will be referred to as “investment intensity”
and “investment rate” interchangeably from hereinafter. In practice, investment intensity often
affects the speed as well as the economic significance of discoveries, both of which are essential
for innovation. The extent to which an R&D project can be accelerated and/or scaled up by more
intensive investment are important characteristics of the innovation technology, but have been
largely ignored in the economics and finance literature. The dynamic and strategic nature of the
investment intensity decision causes non-trivial tradeoff for an innovative firm. These consid-
erations lead to the specific research questions of this paper: how does the impact of financial
constraints on a firm’s R&D investment rate depend on the characteristics of innovation tech-
nologies? How do firms with different financing constraints compete in R&D projects, and how
do their strategic interactions vary with the R&D project characteristics?
To answer these questions, I build a dynamic model of R&D investment. An all-equity firm
with stochastic cash flows faces a now-or-never R&D investment opportunity. It decides whether
or not to start an R&D project, and chooses an investment intensity which is invariant over time
to maximize its value. The time of discovery is random and follows an exponential distribution.
Both the rate parameter of the discovery time and the expected magnitude of the breakthrough
depends positively on the chosen investment intensity. The firm is financially constrained, and
has to rely on internal cash flows to pay for R&D investment each period. Once the firm fails to
pay, it has to terminate the project with no scrap value. Meanwhile, if a competitor reaches a
discovery first, the firm’s project becomes obsolete. A key departure from existing models is that
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I distinguish two typical aspects of R&D project characteristics: accelerability versus scalability.
An accelerable project can be expedited by more intensive investment. Consider a pharmaceutical
company searching the best chemical compound for a drug. Hiring more technicians will likely
help find the most suitable compound sooner. A scalable project’s expected payoff can be raised
by more intensive investment. One example is an R&D project by an automobile firm which aims
at improving a car model that is expected to release at a certain time. Higher investment rate will
probably result in cars withmore-attractive functions and generating higher profits. I assume that
the firm can assess the accelerability and scalability of the R&D project when making decisions.
The first key result is that financial constraints can induce more aggressive R&D investment if
the innovation project is accelerable. Comparing with an unconstrained (“UC”) firm, a financially
constrained (“FC”) firm may invest more intensively in R&D in the absence of competition. This
optimal “over”-investment strategy results from an FC firm’s motive to increase the likelihood of
project survival. Intuitively, financial constraints impose a risk that a firm may run out of money
when its valuable project is still in progress. If this happens, the firm has to terminate the project
and forgo any potential future cash flows associated with a discovery. When determining invest-
ment intensity, an FC firm weighs the cost of investing, the risk of having to abandon the project
due to funding shortages, and the benefit of an earlier and/or better discovery. A speedier discov-
ery can be relatively important for a constrained firm with cash flow risks. Therefore, if the R&D
project is accelerable, an FC firmmay find it optimal to investmore heavily in order to expedite the
discovery, although the higher burning rate of internal cash flowsmakes the financing constraints
bind earlier.
The aforementioned rationale of over-investment from financial constraints does not require
the alleviation of the constraints upon a successful innovation (e.g., Aghion et al., 1999; Povel and
Raith, 2001; Almeida et al., 2011), or the distortion from debt financing on inefficient liquidation
of assets (e.g., Eisdorfer and Hsu, 2011; Lyandres and Zhdanov, 2010), or the agency problem
between shareholders andmanagers for constraints to play a disciplinary role (e.g., Almeida et al.,
2014). It also differs from the effect of a larger discount rate due to an exogenous obsolescence
risk (e.g., Merton, 1976; McDonald and Siegel, 1986). The most closely related work perhaps is by
Boyle and Guthrie (2003), who show that a threat of future cash shortfall introduces the risk of
not being able to fund a growth option later, thus reduces the value of waiting and may lead to
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an earlier exercise of the growth option. My result on investment intensities complements their
finding of the investment timing decision. Instead of focusing on the option value of delaying
investment, I emphasize the innovation technology characteristics which can arguably be more
relevant to R&D type of investment.
The second key result concerns strategic choices of investment intensities in an R&D race
among firms with heterogeneous financing capabilities. I find that, as an equilibrium outcome,
an FC firm can preempt its UC rival when the two compete on accelerable innovation. My model
reveals novel patterns of a firm’s choice of investment intensity as a response to its rival (of differ-
ent constraints): it is monotonically increasing for the FC contestant, but it follows a hump-shape
for the unconstrained contestant. Together, they suggest that the counter-intuitive preemption
happens as a UC firm chooses not to escalate the speed contest in R&D, but instead invests less
intensively and waits for the FC firm to drop out of the race, so it can achieve discovery with a
relatively low cost. This result is related to the weaker status of the FC competitor: a UC firm
can achieve innovation after an FC firm drops out of the race, but an FC firm’s only possibility of
achieving an innovation is by winning the race. This new channel of preemption may help ex-
plain “the standard folklore that smaller firms are more aggressive about entering new markets
or launching new products than bigger, safer, and less financially constrained firms” (Boyle and
Guthrie, 2003) in a competitive setting.
The preemption result comes from my pioneering approach of modeling endogenous R&D
competition with financing consideration. In practice, it is common that only a handful of firms
compete in an innovation race, whichmakes their strategic interactions crucial in the understand-
ing of R&D decisions. Thus, the simplified way ofmodeling competition as an exogenous obsoles-
cence risk (e.g., Hackbarth et al., 2014; Gu, 2016) has its limitations in examining R&D strategies.
I join a few recent studies which model innovation competition endogenously (e.g., Bena et al.,
2016; Ma et al., 2018; Malamud and Zucchi, 2019), and take a step further to allow for hetero-
geneity in firms’ financing capabilities. This approach combined with a closer examination of
technology characteristics of R&D projects also helps pinpoint exceptions to the status quote of
the literature that competitionmotivates innovation. If an R&Dproject is hardly accelerable, then
for a UC firm, having a rival in R&D is equivalent to adding an exogenous obsolescence risk to its
project, which changes the marginal cost and benefit of investment intensity equally. In this case,
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competition has no effect on the investment rate of the UC firm. On the contrary, there is a pos-
itive effect of competition on R&D investment for an FC firm, regardless of whether or not the
project is accelerable.
My model on R&D investment provides a unified framework of examining “termination risk”.
The risk of having to terminate an otherwise valuable project acts like the Sword of Damocles,
which is a significant concern for any firms that conduct R&D. Although it is related to the ma-
turity uncertainty and technical risk in recent R&D models (e.g., Berk et al., 2004; Malamud and
Zucchi, 2019), a careful inspection of termination risk coming frommarket competition, or financ-
ing frictions in combination with various internal cash flow risks in the same model is useful. For
example, contrasting to the negative impact of a termination risk from cash flow volatility (dif-
fusion risk) on investment, a jump risk on cash flows raises investment intensity for an FC firm.
Intuitively, catastrophic events on internal cash flows causes a project termination regardless of
how much liquidity the firm had. They alleviate the negative impact of heavier investment on
earlier constraints binding, and give an FC firm extra incentives to invest, similar to a larger dis-
count rate effect from exogenous competition (e.g., Hackbarth et al., 2014). However, my model
shows the severity of termination risk from competition, and therefore its effect, depends on the
characteristics of all competing firms’ cash flows, financing capacity, as well as their competing
projects’ characteristics. As a tradeoff ofmodel tractability, mymodel is silent on optimal liquidity
management which is relevant for R&D firms.
My model on R&D investment contributes to at least three strands of literature. Firstly, by
providing a new understanding of investment level decisions, this paper contributes to the cor-
porate investment literature and complements endogenous timing models (e.g., McDonald and
Siegel, 1986; Boyle and Guthrie, 2003; Bolton et al., 2011; Hugonnier et al., 2015) in which “the
investment level is not a choice variable”(Gu, 2016). Secondly, by introducing strategic interac-
tions among R&D competitors with different financing constraints, this paper can enlightenmore
in-depth studies in the booming literature on the interaction of finance and industrial organiza-
tion (e.g., Lambrecht, 2001; Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013; Hackbarth et al., 2014; Malamud and
Zucchi, 2019). Thirdly, by recognizing the consequence of investment rate decisions on both the
timing and scale of innovation for the first time in the literature, it provides an analytical tool
to the growing literature on innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g., Krishnan and Wang, 2018;
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Balmaceda, 2018).
The theoretical framework in this paper generates new empirical implications regarding R&D
strategies. For example, it is more likely to observe higher R&D investment rates by financially
constrained firmswhen (1) their cash flow volatility is low; (2) there is a looming challenge on their
existing business or from an external funding source; and (3) they operate in an industry where
innovation technologies are quite accelerable and the focus of competition is speed as opposed to
quality. Amore subtle implication is thatwemay expect unconstrained firms to cut R&D ratemore
heavily than the constrained ones when the product market becomes more volatile. Regarding
the decision to initiate a project, an unconstrained firm is less likely to join an R&D race when its
constrained rivals have a high asset growth rate and/or a low cash flow volatility.
This paper has broader applications in the finance and economics research. It demonstrates
the relevance of cross-industry studies in examining the real effects of financial market frictions
on corporate innovation. A potentially fruitful way of separating industries is by asking whether
the new technologies in development are more likely to be accelerable or scalable. Challenging
as it may sound, this can add a new line of research to the growing empirical literature studying
the role of finance in the innovation process (e.g., Hellmann and Puri, 2000; Lerner et al., 2011;
Manso, 2011; Tian and Wang, 2014; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2017; Malamud and Zucchi, 2019).
Themodelmay also bringnew insights for R&D-drivenmergers and acquisitions (e.g., Bena andLi,
2013; Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013). For instance, it shows the possibility of linking characteristics
of R&D opportunity to the valuation gaps between acquirers and targets when explaining the
waves of acquisition for innovation. In addition, we may also explain time-varying composition
of young and private firms making successful innovation in the economy by examining how the
characteristics of innovation change over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a baseline model examining the effects of
financial constraints on firms’ R&D investment strategies. Section 3 presents the full model with
an endogenous R&D race. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the baseline model, and Section
5 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains proofs and additional graphs.
5
2. A Baseline Model
Consider an all-equity firm that cannot get external financing and faces a potential downfall of
the internal stochastic cash flows from assets in place (“AIP”). This financially constrained (“FC”)
firm is run by a risk-neutral agent whomaximizes the firm value whenmaking decisions. Upon the
arrival of a non-deferrable one-time innovation opportunity, the agent decides whether or not to
start a project, and if she does, she chooses an R&D investment intensity throughout the duration
of the project and decides when to abandon the project, if ever. We compare this firm’s investment
decision with one that can issue new equity at no extra cost, that is, financially unconstrained
(“UC”). Whether the firm is financially constrained or not is exogenous to themodel, and financial
constraints are defined based on the cost of accessing financial markets (as in, e.g., Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997 andBolton et al., 2011). Wedonot interpret the constraints as collateral constraints
(as in, e.g., Li, 2011 and Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013), thus the liquidation of AIP does not
prohibit a UC firm from getting external financing for its innovation project.
The AIP Cash Flows At any time t, the firm’s assets in place generate a cash flow Xt (≥ 0)
which follows a combined geometric Brownian motion/jump process (see Chapter 5.B in Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994):
dXt = µXtdt+ σXtdZt −Xtdq1, (1)
where Z = {Zt; 0 < t <∞} is a standard Brownian motion, and dq1 is the increment of a Poisson
process with mean arrival rate λj . The diffusion process associated with dZt represents uncer-
tainty from the firm’s daily operations, and σ2 is a measure for the conventional cash flow risk.
Meanwhile, the process −Xtdq1 captures an extreme downward jump risk on the cash flows, and
can represent a negative shock on the AIP which wipes out future cash flows and is expected in
1
λj
years. Due to the nature of the shock, I use “jump risk” and “catastrophe risk” interchangeably
hereafter. 1 Note that when the catastrophe hits, an FC firm can no longer fund an ongoing R&D
project and has to terminate it. Consistent with the notion of a firm being unconstrained in the
model, a UC firm is capable of raising funds through external financial markets and continuing
1Here are a few examples of a catastrophe. An car manufacturer is found to have fatal defects in its models, or a
smartphone company is blown by a recall crisis, or a pharmaceutical firm loses its dominant status in a market when
its patent expires and its competitor successfully manufactured a generic drug. The diffusion and the jump processes
are independent from each other.
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the project, although it has no AIP left. We can also think of Eq.(1) as stochastic cash flows from a
financier, so the model can apply not only to an established firm that has an new R&D investment
opportunity, but also to a start-up that uses venture capital funding to develop its first big idea.
The R&D Project Cash Flows The fixed cost of the R&D project is normalized to zero, and
the R&D cash flows do not affect the AIP cash flows, 2 but the latter may impact the former via
the optimal choice of R&D intensity. If the firm starts the project upon its arrival and decides
on an investment intensity R, we assume that this flow cost is constant and continuous before
discovery (similar to Malamud and Zucchi, 2019), unless the project is terminated.3 The project
generates a random one-time payoff ũ at an uncertain discovery time τd, which is modelled as
the first jump time of a Poisson process with parameter λd. The smooth investment assumption is
based on the fact that firms usually cannot cut variable expenses of R&Dprojectswithout seriously
compromising project outcomes (see Brown and Petersen, 2011 for empirical evidence), and the
characterizations of an innovation project are close to that of typical R&Dmodels in finance (such
as Schwartz and Moon, 2000 and Berk et al., 2004), but with two key distinctions. Firstly, the
investment intensity is chosen endogenously. Secondly, both the project payoff and the project
discovery time depend on the investment intensity R. In particular, the one-time payoff of an
R&D project ũ and the discovery rate λd follow
ũ = Ã× f(R), λd = η × I(R). (2)
The expected payoff is u = E(ũ) = A× f(R). The scaling factor A > 0 and the acceleration factor
η > 0 are constants, and the functions f(R) and I(R) are weakly increasing and concave. We
assume the R&D investment has decreasing returns to scale, that is, ∂(uλd)
2
∂2R
< 0, to avoid infinite
optimal investment size. To separate the effect of investment intensity R on the project payoff
and on the project discovery time, we define two kinds of R&D projects accordingly:
Definitions. A scalable R&D project is a project whose final payoff can be scaled up by more
intensive investment. An accelerable R&D project is a project whose discovery can be expedited
2The main results will not change qualitatively if there is a moderate cannibalization cost (e.g., Hackbarth et al.,
2014), that is, a negative effect on the AIP cash flows from a successful innovation.
3One can also interpret R as the searching intensity in the search models (e.g., Mortensen, 1986). More-intense
searching leads to speedier discovery and/or better search outcome.
7
by more intensive investment.
Going beyond the extant research on R&D investment, we capture both the scalability (of the
final outcome) and the accelerability (of the discovery speed) of the input-output relationship for
innovation investment. This novelty allows us to separate the scalable-only projects (I ′(R) = 0,
f ′(R) > 0) and accelerable-only projects (f ′(R) = 0, I ′(R) > 0), and disentangle the effects of
financial constraints on R&D investment through different aspects of project characteristics for
the first time in the literature. Note that the two kinds of projects are not mutually exclusive.
Later in the numerical analysis and comparative statics, I use the simple forms of f(R) = Rβ and
I(R) = Rγ with β, γ ∈ (0, 1) and β + γ < 1, so that the production technology has decreasing
returns to scale. We can interpret β as project scalability, which measures the degree to which the
project is scalable, and interpret γ as project accelerability, which measures the degree to which
the project is accelerable.4
If the project is discontinued before maturity, we assume that the scrap value is zero. The
assumption seems extreme, but the huge uncertainty during innovative project development and
the exclusiveness of accumulated knowledge make it very difficult to evaluate the resale value
of underdeveloped intangible assets. The results are qualitatively the same if the scrap value is
positive. Furthermore, the R&Dproject has no effect on the firm’s financing ability, before or after
the discovery (as in Boyle and Guthrie, 2003). This is to exclude the investment incentive from a
motive to relax financing constraints (Almeida et al., 2011).
The random cash flows from AIP in Eq.(1) can be used to pay for the R&D investment expense
each period, and any residual is paid out as dividends. Following earlier literature on corporate
investment (such as Hennessy et al., 2007), we do not consider liquidity management (as in e.g.,
Bolton et al., 2013; Hugonnier et al., 2015) to keep the model parsimonious but still insightful.5
2.1 The Firm’s Problem
The agent maximizes the firm value by choosing an R&D strategy {1invest, R, X}, where X
is a threshold on the AIP cash flows below which the firm abandons the project. 6 By backward
4More generally, thismodel framework can study the tradeoff between a better-but-slower discovery versus aworse-
but-speedier one (i.e., βγ < 0).
5Admittedly, cash holding policy and liquidity management can be relevant for R&D strategies (see e.g., Brown and
Petersen, 2011; Schroth and Szalay, 2010).
6We can show that the agent optimally abandons an ongoing project if its AIP cash flows falls below a certain level.
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induction, we solve the abandonment thresholdX(R) for any investment intensity R, then picks
the optimal R, and check whether or not the project value is positive to determine the project
initiation decision.









e−rt(−R)dt + e−rτd ũ1{τd<τc∧τj}
]
. (3)
The first term in Expression (3) represents the firm value from AIP cash flows, which ends at the
random jump time τj . The second term is the present value of the future R&D cost. The firm stops
paying for the investment at the earliest time of (1) R&D discovery, (2) project abandonment,
either voluntary or forced by the financial constraints that require Xt ≥ R, and (3) liquidation of
the firm induced by the AIP catastrophe. This is denoted as τd ∧ τc ∧ τj , where τc ≡ inf{t : Xt ≤
X|X ≥ R} is the first time that the AIP cash flows hit the abandonment threshold. The last term
is the present value of the project payoff, which is only realized if the project reaches discovery
before it is terminated, i.e., τd < τc ∧ τj .









e−rt(−R)dt + e−rτd ũ1{τd<τc}
]
. (4)
Exp.(4) differs from Exp.(3) in two ways: (1) the earlier time of project abandonment and AIP
catastrophe is replaced with the project abandonment (i.e., τc ∧ τj → τc), because a UC firm can
raise external funds after the AIP cash flows jump to zero whilst an FC firm cannot. For the same
reason, (2) there is no lower bound for the project abandonment threshold, which we set as zero
for the geometric Brownian motion, i.e., X ≥ 0. We can simplify the analysis for both types of
firms by focusing on the strategies which maximize the R&D project value, given the value of AIP


















2.2 Optimal R&D Strategies - Initiation, Investment intensity and Abandonment
Intuitively, the firm does not abandon an ongoing project voluntarily. Because the project
discovery is random and memoryless, given any chosen investment intensity, the project value is
higher if it lasts longer7. It indicates that the firm optimally sets the lowest possible abandonment
threshold (i.e., XFC = R and XUC = 0) and invests in an ongoing project for as long as it can.
The formal proofs of this intuition and the following result on project value are provided in the
appendix.





























The UC firm’s project value in Eq.(7) follows a formula of the present value of a perpetuity, with
per-period payments of uλd −R and a discount rate of λd + r. The discovery rate λd increases the
discount rate because the project cash flows end once the discovery occurs. The firm can tap the
financial market at no extra cost, so the project value for a UC firm does not depend on AIP cash
flows including the jump risk. The project value of an FC firm in Eq.(8) is a product of two terms.
The first term is similar to Eq.(7), except that the discount rate is further raised by the Poisson
intensity λj which reflects the jump risk of AIP cash flows (as in Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The
second term can be interpreted as the FC firm’s probability of project discovery before the firm
runs out of money. Besides in the discount rate, λj also appears in the second term through α1.
Consistent with Merton (1976) and McDonald and Siegel (1986), the jump risk causes a sudden
ruin of the project and acts like an obsolescence risk which effectively increases the interest rate.
We use the simplex search method by Lagarias et al. (1998) to obtain the optimal investment
intensities numerically. Table 1 shows the model parameters used in this exercise. The baseline
firm’s AIP cash flows expect to decline 20% annually with a 30% annual volatility, and a catas-
7Themodel may appear static due to the no-active-abandonment result, but the nature of the tradeoff that the firm
faces is dynamic.
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trophe on the AIP occurs with a 10% probability per year. The parameter values reflect the high
uncertainty typically associated with innovating firms’ internal cash flows or future funding, and
are close to a few previous studies (e.g., Morellec and Schürhoff, 2011; Hackbarth et al., 2014) ex-
cept the growth rate of AIP µ. We check a wide range of parameter values of µ to ensure our study
is relevant for industries at large, instead of only the sharply declining industries. The baseline
values for the R&D project parameters (i.e. η, γ, A, β) are chosen so that the optimal investment
decisions fall within a reasonable range. 8
[Insert Table 1 here.]
At the baseline example, a constrained company invests much more intensively than an un-
constrained one, by a non-trivial of 103% (13.8 vs. 6.8). The following “over”-investment result is
based on the model solutions from a wide range of parameter values.
Result 1. A financially constrained firm can optimally invest more intensively in an R&D project than
if it is not constrained (“the first best” level).
The main intuition is that by investing more intensively, a constrained firm may be able to
increase its chance of retaining the project value if it is accelerable. Although the financial con-
straints are exogenous, the expected time that the FC firm runs out of internal cash flows is de-
termined by the firm’s choice of the investment intensity: a higher cash burning rate on the R&D
investment leads to an earlier instance of hitting the firm’s constraints and triggering the project
abandonment. If the project is accelerable and depending on the characteristics of the project
and the firm’s cash flows, then by investing more heavily each period, the firm may be able to
push the discovery even sooner than the already earlier constraint hitting time. When speeding
up the project gives the constrained firm the highest expected value, the firm optimally invests
more aggressively comparing with the first best.
This finding may seem similar to what has been recognized in the endogenous investment
timing models, which suggests that the risk of obsolescence or preemption reduces the value of
waiting to invest, thus triggers an earlier exercise of a growth option. More closely related, Boyle
8At the baseline optimum, an FC (UC) monopoly spends around 14% (7%) of its instantaneous AIP cash flows on
R&D, and the project value is around 13% (18%) ofwhat its AIP areworth, at the time of project initiation. The discovery
takes about four (five) years for the FC (UC) monopoly. The FC firm is expected to run out of money in about ten years,
which is slightly sooner than an anticipated catastrophe.
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and Guthrie (2003) find that the threat of future funding shortfalls encourages acceleration of in-
vestment in some states, where the benefits of delay are outweighed by the risk of losing the abil-
ity to finance the project. Instead of investment timing, I focus on the investment level decision,
which is arguably as practical and can be more relevant for innovative firms. When determining
the R&D investment intensity, an FC firm weighs the cost to run the project, the risk of having
to involuntarily terminate the project after its launch, and the benefit of a better and/or an ear-
lier R&D outcome. New to the literature, the effect of financial constraints on R&D investment
rate goes beyond the effect of a larger interest rate, and it is also distinctive from maximizing the
project survival.
We use Figure 1 to visualize the trade-offs faced by an FC firm in this model. The parameter
values are set as in Table 1. The solid blue lines in Figure 1 plot a sample path of the AIP cash
flows, and the dashed lines depict R&D expenses. When the former crosses the latter from above,
involuntary abandonment happens. In the left panel, the firm invests at the optimal level as if
it were not constrained. Consequently, involuntary project abandonment occurs in Year 5, and it
is earlier than the expected R&D discovery. In the right panel, the FC firm invests at its optimal
level, whichmoves the project abandonment forward toYear 4. However, themore aggressive R&D
investment speeds up the discovery and pushes the expected maturity earlier than abandonment.
Therefore, it is possible that the FC firm is able to finish the R&D project before it runs out of
money in the second but not the first case.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
Next we examine two potential determinants in an FC firm’s tradeoff: the payoff characteristics
of the R&D project and the AIP cash flow risks, separately.
Accelerability Versus Scalability More intense investment leads to earlier burn-out of internal
capital. If a project is not accelerable (that is, if ∂λd(R)∂R = 0), then the negative marginal effect of
a more intense R&D investment on the firm value always forces a constrained firm to reduce its
R&D investment from the first best level. The following result (proved in the appendix) establishes
project accelerability as a necessary condition for over-investment by an FC firm.
Result 2. If an R&D project is scalable but not accelerable, an FC firm always invests at a lower level




Cash Flows Risks Both the diffusion risk and jump risk in AIP can cause project termination for
an FC firm, but the mechanisms differ. Lowering investment intensity delays project termination
caused by diffusion risk, however, it has no effect on the jump-risk-induced termination. On the
contrary, a catastrophe risk in AIP effectively reduces the cost of financial constraints by lower-
ing the concern of hitting the constraints early when the investment level is high, so it increases
optimal investment scale. More formally, I prove the following result in the appendix.
Result 3. If an R&D project is only scalable, then a downward jump risk on AIP cash flows motivates





I conjecture that the motivational effect of a jump risk is stronger if the project can be acceler-
atedmodestly, which implies a positive effect of the jump risk λj on the endogenous discovery rate
λd. Project accelerability provides an additional incentive for an FCfirm to invest, and the same ad-
ditional incentive for a UC firm is not large enough to eliminate the over-investment. At the base-
line, if the jump on AIP cash flows is expected in two years instead of ten, then an FC firm invests
two times more in a scalable-only project than without the jump. When we turn on the project
accelerability, the FC firm invests three times more than without the jump. However, I find evi-
dence from numerical exercises that instead of being a necessary condition for over-investment,
the jump risk only enhances it. Without project accelerability, having a jump risk does not change
the fact that the marginal effect of investment intensity on project survival is negative, so the
marginal benefit of R on project payoff has to be greater than 1 which implies underinvestment.
This argument also shows that the over-investment induced by financial constraints is not just
driven by a discount effect from obsolescence. To conclude from Result 1 - 3:
Proposition 2. Financial constraints can make a firm invest more intensively in R&D. Project accel-
erability is necessary for over-investment induced by financial constraints. A downward cash flow jump
risk always increases a constrained firm’s R&D investment, but it only exacerbates the over-investment
incentive instead of being a necessary condition.
Going back to the R&D project initiation decision, the firm optimally starts a non-deferrable
innovative project if its value is positive. We can calculate such project value from Proposition
1 with the optimal R. If the project requires some initial investment cost κ, the firm optimally
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carries out the project if its value exceeds the fixed cost. Ceteris paribus, a UC firm is more likely
to initiate investment than an FC firm because the UC firm’s project value is always higher.
2.3 Implications On R&D Investment Intensity
I study comparative statics regarding how investment intensity is affected by the characteris-
tics of innovation technology and the firm’s cash flows. I show in Figure 2 the investment intensity
with respect to the project scaling factor (A), scalability (β), acceleration factor (η), and acceler-
ability (γ) around the baseline. The solid blue lines correspond to an unconstrained firm’s R&D
investment, and the dashed red lines correspond to a constrained firm. All these parameters have
positive effects on the investment, regardless of the financial constraints. Panel (a) suggests that
an FC firm’s investment is more sensitive to the project scaling factor A when A is low, compared
with a UC firm. When A improves from a low level (e.g., from 50 to 100), an FC firm’s investment
increases (e.g., from 3 to 14) more than a UC firm’s (e.g., from 2 to 6). However, as A becomes
larger, an FC firm’s investment becomes less sensitive. It is probably because sustaining project
development at a high level is more andmore difficult for an FC firm. Overall, the over-investment
is more apparent when A is at a medium level.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
Panel (b) uncovers the effect of changes in the project scalability β. When the project is not scal-
able (β = 0),R∗UC = 2 andR
∗
FC = 12.5. As the project becomesmore scalable (e.g., β rises to 0.08),
R∗UC increases much more (e.g., to R
∗




UC = 28). In general, a UC firm
is more responsive to β than an FC firm because it can always take the full advantage of project
scalability without the concern on its financial ability to support R&D.
In comparison, Panels (c) and (d) plot the effects of the accelerability related aspect of R&D
projects. Panel (c) shows that the acceleration factor η influences investment in a similar way as
A, and Panel (d) shows a contrasting impact of project accelerability γ, different from scalability
β in Panel (b). Unlike how firms respond to β, an FC firm is more responsive to γ than a UC firm,
especially as γ gets closer to 1. When γ improves (e.g., from 0.4 to 0.8), R∗FC increases more (e.g.,
from 2.4 to 27) than R∗UC (e.g., from 2 to 15). This is consistent with the discussion proceeding
Proposition 2 regarding the different effects of the scalable and accelerable aspects of a project.
Accelerability may help the FC firm avoid involuntary abandonment, and thus has a larger effect
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on the FC firm’s R&D intensity than a UC firm’s.
I also examine the impact of a firm’s AIP cash flows characteristics on its innovation strategy.
In Figure 3, I plot optimal investment intensities by changing one aspect of AIP cash flows whilst
keeping the other parameters at the baseline values. Clearly, all four panels confirm that a UC
firm’s investment is invariant with changes in AIP cash flows. Panel (a) shows a positive response
of an FC firm’s investment with respect to AIP cash flows level X at the project arrival. A larger
profit from existing business enables an FC firm to spend more on R&D. As X increases, the FC
firm’s investment converges to what would have been the optimal investment for a UC firm if it
were not subject to the jump risk. Panel (b) shows that as the cash flows decline faster, the FC
firm reduces its investment. Numerical solutions with a large set of parameter values confirm
that, although it is helpful to develop our intuition, the deterioration of AIP cash flows is not a
necessary condition for over-investment induced by financial constraints.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
Panels (c) and (d) plot the effects of two sources of uncertainty regarding firm liquidity: a jump
risk and a volatility risk. The effects are opposite on a constrained firm’s R&D investment. As
the intensity of a catastrophe risk increases (e.g., λj ↑↑ from 0.1 to 0.5) in Panel (d), an FC firm
chooses a much larger R&D investment (e.g. increases from 14 to 28). On the contrary, when the
cash flow volatility σ increases (e.g., doubles from 0.2 to 0.4) in Panel (c), an FC firm reduces its
investment intensity (e.g., from about 14 to 13). A larger jump risk reduces the marginal cost of
investment, thus motivates investment. A larger volatility risk makes the endogenous constraint
hitting happens sooner, and leads to a more conservative innovation strategy. In contrast, using
an investment timingmodel, Boyle andGuthrie (2003) find that greater uncertainty about firm liq-
uidity increases current investment, because it raises the risk of future funding shortfalls, thereby
lowering the value of waiting.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 together reveal that financial constraints are more likely to induce R&D
investment when it is relatively easy to accelerate project development but difficult to scale up
the discovery payoff (γ ↑, β ↓), and when the firm has better AIP cash flow prospects (X ↑, µ ↑,
σ ↓) but faces more imminent catastrophe risk (λj ↑).
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2.4 Value Implications
The frictions in financial markets force a firm to deviate from the first-best decisions. Thus,
ceteris paribus, project values of an FC firm are always lower than those of a UC firm. The baseline
model allows us to gauge the difference of project values due to financial frictions, and how it
depends on cash flows characteristics and R&D investment characteristics.
Figure 4 shows how project value changes with AIP cash flows. It highlights the relevance of a
firm’s AIP cash flows in the valuation of an R&D project when the firm is constrained. The project
value of a UC firm is invariant of the AIP cash flows. For an FC firm, the upper panels imply that
its R&D project value increases with the level and growth rate of AIP cash flows, and the lower
panels reveal negative effects of cash flow volatility and the downward jump risk on its project
value. A higher cash flow volatility usually indicates a higher value of a growth option, and this
makes the pattern in Panel (c) seem counter-intuitive. Unlike the investment timing model, the
investment scale decision is endogenous in this model, and a higher volatility leads to a lower
optimal investment intensity. The pattern in Panel (c) thus reflects the direct effect of a higher
volatility and an indirect effect through a lower level of investment. Panel (d) illustrates the same
directional impact of a negative cash-flow shock as the cash flow volatility in Panel (c), only that
the project value is concave in σ but convex in λj .
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
Figure 5 plots project values with respect to changes in R&D project characteristics. We can see
that project values increase with the project’s scaling factor, scalability, acceleration factor, and
accelerability (A ↑ in Panel (a), β ↑ in Panel (b), η ↑ in Panel (c), and γ ↑ in Panel (d)) regardless
of financial frictions. All four parameters can be interpreted as measures of project quality, which
have positive effects on project values.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
The comparative statics on project values may shed light on the patterns of R&D - driven merg-
ers and acquisitions. Recent studies such as Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) and Bena and Li (2013)
documented that large and more financially capable firms acquire smaller and young innovative
firms, especially when the credit market freezes. My findings add to this literature by showing
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how such acquisitions may depend on the smaller and young innovative firms’ cash flows, as well
as their project characteristics. One can think of a non-deferrable R&D project being available
only to an FC firm but not to a UC firm. Figure 4 and numerous unreported results based on large
sets of model parameters suggest that the valuations from the two types of firms differ the most
when the FC firm’s cash flows are low (XFC ↓), decline at a faster rate (µFC ↓), being more volatile
(σFC ↑), and face a higher catastrophe risk (λj ↑). Therefore, more R&D - motivated acquisitions
are expected in those situations due to the larger gains to acquisitions. Meanwhile, we need to in-
terpret such testable implications cautiously, because the model excludes an explicit motivation
of being acquired or to acquire innovation.
3. The Model With An R&D Race
Firms often compete with others on innovative products or technologies in terms of speed, and
the number of innovation competitors is usually not small. Like financial constraints, the compe-
tition also imposes a termination risk to firms: one firm’s successful innovation makes its com-
petitors’ R&Dprojects obsolete in a winner-takes-all market. Unlike financial constraints, the ter-
mination risk from competition is usually a result of strategic interactions in market equilibrium.
That’s why I do not regard competition as an exogenous risk as previous studies (e.g.,Eisdorfer
and Hsu, 2011; Hackbarth et al., 2014; Gu, 2016). But instead, I endogenize the obsolescence risk
from competition by examining firms’ equilibrium R&D strategies in a duopoly setting. Built on
my baseline model, now two firms conduct R&D investment and compete in innovation as in a
patent race (e.g., Loury, 1979; Weeds, 2002). The firms decide on their R&D investment intensi-
ties simultaneously with complete information.
3.1 Competition Among UC Firms
As a benchmark case, both competitors are financially unconstrained, and we call it “homoge-
neous duopoly”.9 Proposition 3 presents the project values with its proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. When two financially unconstrained firms compete against each other in an R&D
9A duopoly with two constrained competitors is an interesting case to study. However, adding this complex two-
dimension free boundary problem is not necessary for the main insights of the paper. I therefore omit this case for
potential future studies.
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project, the equilibrium project values are
V1 =
u1λd,1 −R1




r + λd,1 + λd,2
(10)
where (R1, R2) is a pair of equilibrium R&D investment levels of the two unconstrained firms, ui is the
expected one-time project payoff for Firm i, and λd,i is Firm i’s discovery rate for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Project values are independent of a firm’s own and its rival’s cash flows because both firms
are unconstrained. The project value of a UC duopoly is similar to the baseline model (Eq.(7) in
Proposition 1), except that the competitor’s success rate (λd,−i) enters the discount rate. If the
project is not accelerable (i.e., λd does not depend onR), then competing against another UC firm
is equivalent to introducing an exogenous termination risk. In this case, competition reduces the
marginal benefit and marginal cost of investment equally, and the firm’s optimal R&D strategy
remains the same as the baseline.
Result 4. Competition among unconstrained firms motivates higher levels of R&D investment only if
the innovative project is accelerable. The motivational effect of competition in an accelerable project is
stronger if the project has a higher expected payoff, or if the project is more accelerable.
The widely accepted notion that competition enhances innovation (e.g.,Weeds, 2002) holds
with conditions related to project characteristics. When the maturity of an innovation project is
fixed ex ante, competition between two UC firms does not make them more aggressive even if the
project is scalable. However, if the project is accelerable, then the marginal benefit of speeding up
the discovery and winning the competition exceeds the marginal cost of investment. This makes
a duopoly firm invest at a higher rate than at the baseline. The positive effect from competition is
stronger if the firm is able to shorten the project maturity more easily (γ ↑ or η ↑).
3.2 Competition Between An FC Firm And A UC Firm
Firms competing in innovation usually vary in their financing abilities. It can appear in the
form of a small firm competing against a large one, or a young firm competing against a mature
one, and so on. I abstract from the various scenarios and focus on analyzing market equilibria in
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which an FC company competes with a UC company in their R&D projects. We call the market
“heterogeneous duopoly”. Proposition 4 presents the project values in such cases.
Proposition 4. In a heterogeneous duopoly, the R&D project values for the FC firm (“Firm 1”) and
the UC firm (“Firm 2") are
V1(X1) =
u1λd,1 −R1





u2λd,2 −R2 + λjV m2 (R2)
r + λd,2 + λd,1 + λj
(1− (X1
R1




respectively. (R1, R2) is a pair of the equilibrium investment levels, λd,i and ui are the equilibrium
discovery rate and expected project payoff of Firm i, i ∈ {1, 2}, and λj is the jump density of the FC











. V m2 (R2) is the UC firm’s project




The only state variable for both competitors is the constrained firm’s AIP cash flows X1. The
UC firm’s cash flows do not affect its own investment decision, and thus should have no impact on
its FC rival’s strategy. There are two possible market structures at the time of a project discovery.
If both firms were still developing the project right before the discovery, then it was a duopoly.
If the FC firm was already forced to abandon the project due to shortages of funds, then it was
a monopoly by the UC firm. Correspondingly, the project value in Eq.(12) is a weighted average
of the two scenarios for the UC firm, with weights being the probabilities. Likewise, Eq.(11) is a
weighted average of FC firm’s project values under the two scenarios, with the project value being
zero in the second case.
It is clear from an inspection of Eq.(12) and Eq.(11) that a heterogeneous competition does not
incentivize a UC firm to change its investment strategy from the baseline if the discovery rate is
fixed. This observation strengthens the result from Result 4, and can be stated as follows:
Result 5. Regardless of the rival firm’s financing ability, an innovation competition only changes a UC
firm’s R&D investment if the project under competition is accelerable.
3.3 Market Equilibrium
To find the equilibrium investment strategies, I examine firms’ best responses to their com-
petitor’s R&D intensity. New to the literature, numerical solutions on a wide range of parameters
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for the model reveal two interesting patterns of R&D investment as a result of strategic interac-
tions:10 1) a UC firm’s best response is non-monotonic in a heterogeneous duopoly, and 2) re-
gardless of being financially constrained or not, a firm always reacts to a UC competitor’s more
aggressive investment by investing more in R&D.
Figure 6 illustrates the two firms’ best responses regarding their R&D investment intensities.
Panel (a) graphs a heterogeneous duopoly, and Panel (b) graphs a homogeneous duopoly. The
blue solid line in Panel (a) shows a hump-shaped investment intensity of a UC firm, as responses
to its constrained competitor. The graph demonstrates a force that reduces the UC firm’s optimal
investment when its FC competitor invests beyond a certain level. As the FC firm invests more,
the UC firm perceives a higher likelihood of project abandonment by the FC firm as a result of
the faster burning rate of the cash flows. Consequently, competing head-to-head against the FC
firm becomes less appealing. Instead, the UC firm invests at a level closer to its baseline level to
maximize the project value.
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
On the other hand, a firm always becomes more aggressive in accelerable projects when facing
an UC competitor, which can be seen from the monotonicity of the green circled lines in both
panels. The intuition is similar to the effect of a catastrophe risk on an FC firm in Result 3. A firm
has to forgo any potential profit associated with the project once its UC rival, who never abandons
the project, makes a discovery. Therefore, the firm is motivated to expedite its discovery in order
to lower the probability of losing the contest.
Regardingmarket equilibrium, examining where best responses intersect in Figure 6 help with
the intuition. The symmetry of best response functions in Panel (b) leads to identical equilibrium
investments in a homogeneous duopoly, at which point, the slopes of the best-response functions
are positive. However, evident from Panel (a), best responses in a heterogeneous duopoly can
intersect at a point where the slope of the UC firm’s best response is almost flat. The UC firm
has a motive to profit from the project when the FC competitor drops out, which pushes down its
best-response curve and makes it less sensitive to its FC rival’s investment. It could appear that a
UC firm is sitting on the sideline of an innovation competition against an FC firm.
10Numerical solutions suggest that the fixed point for firms’ best-response correspondences is unique when model
parameters are within reasonable ranges.
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In Table 2, I list the equilibriumR&D investment intensities and project values under different
market structures at the parametrization in Table 1. Both an FC firm and a UC firm increase their
investment in a duopoly, compared with their baseline levels. They also both experience a large
drop in the project value as a result of competition. In addition, competing against a UC firm is
more fierce than it is against an FC firm, and it leads to even more aggressive investment strategy.
Column (2) shows that for an FC firm, competition doubles the investment (from 13.8 to 29.4)
and cuts down one-third of the project value (from 37.6 to 21.8). Column (3) shows a threefold
increase in investment (from 6.8 in the baseline to 24.4 in heterogeneous duopoly) and a half-cut
of the project value (from 52.6 to 25.3) for a UC firm.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
3.4 Investment Decision And Project Value
To understandmarket equilibria more broadly, I conduct comparative statics analysis on equi-
librium investments and project values. Figure 7 depicts equilibrium investments in heteroge-
neous duopoly from some of the analyses. Panel (a) graphs the equilibrium investment as a func-
tion of an FC duopoly’s cash flow volatility while keeping all other parameters at the baseline.
A market equilibrium is represented by a pair of investment intensities sharing the same x-axis
value, with the UC firm on the solid line and the FC firm on the dotted line. As the FC firm’s cash
flow volatility increases (σFC ↑), both firms reduce their R&D investments. However, the UC firm
reduces its investment more than the constrained competitor. It is because the probability of the
UC firm ending up being the monopoly in the market is likely to be higher in such cases. The UC
firm’s R&D investment correspondingly moves toward its baseline level.
[Insert Figure 7 here.]
Panel (b) and Panel (c) in Figure 7 graphmarket equilibria as functions of project scaling factor
A of the UC firm and FC firm respectively. Both firms react to the UC firm’s project quality mea-
sured by A positively in Panel (b). Nevertheless, the UC firm stops increasing its R&D investment
when the project of the FC competitor improves beyond a certain level in Panel (c). This pattern
highlights the different investment incentives for the UC and FC firms regarding the rival’s project
payoff characteristics in a duopoly competition.
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Moreover, firms invest more heavily in R&D in equilibrium if either their own project quality
or their rival’s project quality is better (A ↑, η ↑, β ↑, γ ↑). They also both invest more if the
FC competitor’s cash flows start at a higher level, have lower diffusion and/or jump risks, and
deteriorate at a slower rate (X ↑,σ ↓, λj ↓ ,µ ↑). In terms of the investment sensitivity to its own
project characteristics, a UC firm always reacts more positively than an FC firm. However, an FC
firm’s investment is more sensitive to its rival’s project characteristics compared with a UC firm.
Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 present these comparative statics around the baseline.
Regarding project values for the two firms in a heterogeneous duopoly, they alwaysmove in the
opposite directions whenever one’s project characteristics or AIP cash flows change. This confirms
the intuition that if one firm’s project quality improves, its own project value increases while its
opponent’s project value decreases in general. In addition, the UC firm’s AIP has no effect on both
firms’ strategies and project values in equilibrium. However, the FC firm’s project worths more
and the UC firm’s project worths less if the FC firm’s AIP cash flows have higher growth and lower
volatility.
The model has the potential to extend the baseline implications on R&D-driven mergers and
acquisitions. Table 2 shows a large increase in the UC firm’s project value, if the project is carried
out by the UC firm alone as opposed to be by both firms (V = 25.3 → 52.6). Similarly, there is
a value increase to the FC firm if there is no R&D competition. More importantly, the project
value for a UC monopoly exceeds the sum of project values in the heterogeneous duopoly (52.6
vs. 25.3 + 20.4 = 45.7). This gap could indicate a profitable acquisition by the UC firm, and its
magnitude depends on innovation project characteristics and firm cash flow characteristics.
3.5 Preemption
In the context of my model, one firm preempts another in R&D competition when it achieves
the discovery first. 11 With preemption defined this way, I find that an FC firm may preempt a UC
firm in a head-to-head R&D competition. For example, Row (3) in Table 2 showsRFC > RUC (29.4
vs. 24.4), which indicates an earlier expected discovery by the constrained firm. This is not a mere
extension of the over-investment result in the baseline model. Competition motivates a UC firm’s
R&D investmentmore than an FC firm because a UC firmhas no funding restriction. However, this
11Alternatively, a preemption in a heterogeneous duopoly can be understood as a firm investing more aggressively
than it would in a homogeneous duopoly or in a monopoly in this setup. See Fudenberg et al. (1983) for a dynamic
setting of preemption, in which the relative position during the race matters for firms’ decisions.
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competition driven investment incentive does not fully eliminate the over-investment fromfinan-
cial constraints. When it is very likely for the constrained rival to blow up the cash flows before
its project discovery, the unconstrained firm pulls back its R&D activity from the homogeneous
duopoly level, and behaves more like in baseline. Meanwhile, the only way for an FC duopoly to
retain project value from competition is to be aggressive. Such strategic considerations lead to
preemption by a constrained firm.
Result 6. In an equilibrium with heterogeneous duopoly on R&D, an FC firm can preempt a UC firm
by investing more intensively.
The novelty of the preemption result is also reflected by the fact that the conditions for pre-
emption is different than those for over investment in the baseline model. From unreported large
numbers of numerical solutions, a constrained firm is more likely to preempt its unconstrained
competitor when its cash flow risk is high, deteriorates faster, and starts at a higher level (σ ↑,
λj ↑, µ ↓, X ↑). Recall that in the baseline model, an FC firm is more likely to over-investment
comparing with a UC firm when its AIP cash flow diffusion risk is low and it declines more slowly
(σ ↓, µ ↑). The opposite conditions for preemption in heterogeneous competition are a result of
the strategic interactions in the duopoly equilibrium.
In the model, we exclude new entries in the innovation competition, which can be justified by
the high barrier of entry due to the specific knowledge or human capital needed to develop R&D
projects. If instead, firms can enter the innovative market by paying a fixed cost, and there is a
large pool of potential contestants, then the profits should be competed away. Because an un-
constrained firm always values an R&D project more than an otherwise identical but constrained
firm, we expect R&D investments to only come from unconstrained firms in a fully competitive
market. The fact that a more constrained firm makes R&D investment in a competitive environ-
ment with endogenous entry is likely to suggest that its project is superior in some aspects or it
has a low fixed cost to start. Moreover, the results on over-investment and preemption can imply
a socially negative or positive effect of financial constraints on innovation, depending on whether
one takes the view that there is too much innovation (Biais, Rochet, and Woolley, 2015) or too
little innovation (Hall and Lerner, 2010) than socially optimal.
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4. Model Robustness
As a robustness check for the baseline model, I examine an FC firm’s R&D strategy if it can
access external financing at a cost. Consider a firm which can finance its cash flow gap (R − Xt)
at some cost g((R−Xt)+) when its instantaneous AIP cash flowXt falls short of R&D investment
costR. We call it a costly external financing firm, or a “CEF firm". The cost function g(·) captures a
cash bribery to the existing equity holders when it issues new equity or a flotation cost at issuance,
and it is increasing and convex.12 In the numerical exercise g((R − Xt)+) = δ((R − Xt)+)2. The
scalar δ (> 0) indicates the extent to which the firm is constrained. Assume the CEF firm follows
a threshold strategy and keeps investing in the R&D project until Xt ≤ XCEF ,13 and there is no
catastrophic risk—that is, λj →∞. The R&D project value for a CEF firm is









where abandonment time is defined similarly as before τc = inf{t : Xt ≤ XCEF }. Using either
dynamic programming or the contingent claimapproach, we can get theHamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation of the project value before discovery or abandonment:
(r + λd)V = µXVX +
1
2
σ2X2VXX + λdu−R− g(X). (14)
The Appendix shows how to solve this ordinary differential equation (ODE) with boundary condi-
tions. Figure 8 illustrates two examples of abandonment thresholds XCEF . The green 45-degree
line plots the abandonment threshold for an FC firm (δ =∞), which shows thatXCEF = R and it
is consistent with Proposition 1. One can view the horizontal axisXCEF = 0 as the case for a UC
firm. The blue line corresponds to the abandonment threshold when the financing cost parameter
δ = 2. The red line corresponds to the abandonment threshold when the financing cost is δ = 0.5.
The flat parts of the colored lines indicate that a firm does not carry out the project, because it has
negative NPV at these investment levels.
12The sameassumptions are used in papers onfinancial constraints such asKaplan andZingales (1997) andHennessy
and Whited (2007).
13Another possible threshold strategy is based on the state of accumulative investment, as it is used in Berk et al.
(2004). I eliminate this alternative threshold strategy because the project success intensity is exogenous, and the Pois-
son process implies a constant success possibility in any instance.
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[Insert Figure 8 here.]
Notice that a CEF firm’s optimal financing threshold is lower than a constrained firm and higher
than an unconstrained firm—that is,X∗CEF (R) ∈ (0, R). This means that a CEF firm makes use of
the external financing partially. In addition, the more costly it is to obtain external financing, the
higher the abandonment threshold is, and the earlier the expected endogenous project abandon-
ment. We can then use the optimal abandonment threshold and solve for RCEF numerically, and
verify that it lies between RUC and RFC .
5. Final Remarks
Using a parsimonious model, I examine the impacts of financial constraints and competition
on corporate innovation with a focus on firms’ R&D investment intensity decision. While finan-
cial constraints often reduce firms’ incentive to invest in R&D, I show that they can also raise R&D
investment if the project is accelerable. Preemption by constrained firms can occur inmarket equi-
librium as a result of strategic interactions among firms with different financing constraints. The
model yields novel testable implications on values and R&D investment rate based on the charac-
teristics of a firm’s cash flows and its R&D investment opportunity, and those of its competitor’s.
By incorporating both project accelerability (widely considered in the patent race literature)
and project scalability (often assumed in the investment literature), my paper shows that the char-
acteristics of innovation projects can significantly impact a firm’s R&D decisions. This study calls
for more careful empirical investigations on R&D investment through the consideration of inno-
vation technology, and can help understand corporate decisions which not only affect the levels
but also the timing of cash flows.
There are a few directions for related future research. One regards endogenous choice of in-
novation technology by firms with different financing frictions, especially if firms can trade off
between innovation speed and scale. A second one regards the impact of having sequential in-
vestment opportunities on the R&D investment decision. Another significant omission in this
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Figure 1 – A Constrained Firm’s Tradeoff in the Baseline Model
This figure illustrates the trade-off of a constrained firm at the baseline model, using parameter values in Table 1. The
solid blue line plots a sample path of the AIP cash flows, and the dashed lines depict R&D expenses. The left panel
uses an unconstrained firm’s optimal investment intensity and the right panel uses a constrained firm’s optimal invest-
ment intensity. When the AIP cash flows cross the R&D investment from above, involuntary abandonment happens
(represented by a red dot). Expected R&D discovery is marked as a green dot.
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Figure 2 – R&D Investment Intensities with respect to Project Parameters
Figure 3 – R&D Investment Intensities with respect to Cash Flow Parameters
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Figure 4 – R&D Project Values with respect to Cash Flow Parameters
Figure 5 – R&D Project Values with respect to Project Parameters
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Figure 6 – Best Responses in Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Competition
(a) (b)
Figure 7 – Market Equilibria in Heterogeneous Duopolies
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8 – Optimal Abandonment Threshold
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Table 1 – Baseline Parameter Values for Numerical Solutions
Parameter Value
Discount rate r = 0.05
Discovery rate (λd = ηRγ) η = 0.05, γ = 0.7
Expected project payoff (u = ARβ) A = 100, β = 0.01
AIP cash flows at the project’s arrival X = 100
Decline rate of AIP cash flows µ = −0.2
Volatility of AIP cash flows σ = 0.3
Catastrophe risk of AIP cash flows λj = 0.1
Table 2 – Investment Intensities and Project Values
The constrained firm The unconstrained firm
Baseline R = 13.8, V = 37.6 R = 6.8, V = 52.6
Heterogeneous duopoly R = 29.4, V = 21.8 R = 24.4, V = 25.3
Homogeneous duopoly – R = 35.5, V = 21.7
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Appendix A. Proofs and derivations
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Recall that the state variable for the project value is the cash flow from assets in place which
follows a mixed Poisson-Wiener process of the form dXX = µdt + σdZ + dqj , where dqj takes the
value of -1 with probability λdt and 0 with probability 1−λdt. By Itô’s lemma (Chapter 3.6 of Dixit









σ2X2 + λj [V (0)− V ]
}
dt
For the optimal strategy, the required rate of return for investing in the project should equal to the
expected rate of capital gain minus the flow payment to the project and plus the expected payoff
of the project at discovery whilst taking the discovery probability into consideration. Therefore,




−R+ λd(u− V ). (15)
If the firm is unconstrained, then the value of the project does not depend on the internal
cash flow. Thus VX = 0, VXX = 0, and V (0) = V . Then from Eq.(15), we can get the project




. Note that we can also get the same expression by formulating the






If the firm is constrained, then the value of the project when there is no internal cash flow
should be zero. With V (0) = 0, Eq.(15) becomes








σ2X2 + λdu−R. (16)
The solution to the ordinary differential equation follows the form of V (X) = A1Xα1 +A2Xα2 +
uλd−R
r+λd+λj
,whereα1, α2 are the solutions of the quadratic function 12σ
2α(α−1)+µα−(r+λd+λj) = 0,











. Suppose α1 < 0 and α2 > 0. The project value is





r + λd + λj
(17)
V (X = X) = 0. (18)
The first no-bubble condition gives usA2=0, and the second valuematching condition at the aban-









A usual smooth pasting condition at the abandonment is not used to solve the problem because
voluntary abandonment is not optimal. It is obvious that the lower the abandonment thresholds
are, the higher the project values will be, thereforeX∗FC = R.
Proof of Result 2
Proof. Non-accelerability implies that the discovery rate λd does not depend onR. The first-order











)α1) = 0. (20)
The first of the two terms is negative, because u(R)λd > R (for a firm to start the project), and the
derivative of 1− (XR )
α1 with regard toR is always negative. We know 1− (XR )
α1 > 0, so it has to be
u′(R)λd−1 > 0 atR∗FC for Eq.(20) to hold. It is clear from a UC firm’s problem that u′(R)λd−1 = 0




UC . The second-order derivative shows that a sufficient













λd + r + λj︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0




λd + r + λj
α1︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(−1− α1)Xα1R−2−α1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
Proof of Result 3





= 0 as the first order condition for the FC firm. When λd
does not depend on R, we can write
h(R∗, λj) = (u
′λd − 1)((1− (
X
R∗













α1)+2(u′λd−1)α1Xα1R∗−α1−1 +(uλd−R∗)α1(−α1−1)Xα1R∗−α1−2 < 0













































































h(R∗, λj) = 0 is used to get Eq.(21) from the equation before that. The last term in Eq. (21) is
a decreasing function of XR∗ on its domain
X
R∗ ∈ [1,∞], and it is zero when
X
R∗ → 1 whilst it is





Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Let’s call the two UC firms Firm 1 and Firm 2. The two firms’ problems are the same, so we
just prove the project value for Firm 1. The subscript i denote the firms, and we use τ to denote

































λ1 + λ2 + r
Alternatively, we can also use the Bellman equation which describes the condition that the re-
quired rate of return for the investment equals the expected rate of capital gain minus the flow
payment, plus the expected probability weighted payoff at project discovery and subtract the ex-
pected probability weighted loss at rival’s discovery:
rV1 = EDV1 −R1 + λ1(u1 − V1) + λ2(0− V1).
Because the cost of external financing and internal financing is the same for a UC firm, its project
value does not depend on its own cash flow or its rival’s cash flow. Also the project value is not
time dependent. Therefore EDV1 = 0, and we can get the project value.
Proof of Result 4
Proof. To show the effect of competition on aUCfirm, say Firm1, we compare R̂1 = argmaxR
u1λ1−R1
r+λ1+λ2
with competition and R̄1 = argmaxR
u1λ1−R1
r+λ1
without competition. Because the rate of the rival’s
success λ2 acts as an added discount factor, comparing the two investment scales is equivalent to
derive the sign of ∂R̄1∂r . If it is positive, then competition on R&D increases the UC firm’s invest-
ment.
If the project is accelerable, that is, λ1 = λ1(R1), and for simplicity on the derivation, let’s
focus on the projects that are not scalable, i.e., ∂u1∂R1 = 0. The first order condition for R̄1 is that
h(R̄1) = λ
′
1(u1r+ R̄1)− (r+λ1) = 0, which implies that λ′1u1−1 = u1λ1−R1u1r+R . The last expression is
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positive given the project was started. Because ∂h∂r = λ
′
1u1− 1 > 0 and ∂h∂R̄1 = λ
′′
1(u1r+ R̄1) < 0, we





> 0. Back to the effect of competition,
this implies that R̂1 > R̄1 for any λ2 > 0, i.e., competition increases a UC firm’s R&D investment
scale if the project is accelerable.
However, if the project is not accelerable, that is, λ1 does not depend on R1, then the first
order condition indicates that both R̂1 and R̄1 satisfy u′1(R)λ1 = 1. Since u′1(R) is monotonic by
assumption, R̂1 = R̄1, that is, R&D competition does not affect a UC firm’s R&D investment scale.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Denote the FC firm as Firm 1 and the UC firm as Firm 2. Replace λd by λd to simplify the
subscripts. The project value during innovation race for Firm 1 satisfies the followingHJB equation
at the optimum:












1 + λj [V1(0) − V1]
}
dt and V1(0) = 0. The solution of






a1, a2 are the roots of the quadratic function 12σ
2
1α(α − 1) + µ1α − (r + λ1 + λ2 + λj) = 0. The





r + λ2 + λ1 + λj
(23)
V1(X1 → X1) = 0. (24)
The first condition states that when the FC firm’s AIP cash flows become very high, its project
value almost converges to that of an unconstrained firm, except that the discount rate includes
the jump rate of AIP cash flow because such a jump stops the project cash flow for the FC firm
but not for a UC firm. The second is a value matching condition. We then obtain Eq.(11) in the
proposition, provided that the optimal abandonment thresholdX1 equals its minimal level R1.
For the UC firm in the innovation race, its project value satisfies the HJB equation:
rV2dt = EDV2 −R2dt+ λ2(u2 − V2)dt+ λ1(0− V2)dt+ λj(V m2 − V2)dt, (25)












1 + λj [V2(X1 = 0)− V2(X1)]
}
dt and V2(X1 = 0) is the
UC firm’s monopolistic project value given it invests atR2. For simplicity, we denote it as V m2 . The




u2λ2 −R2 + λjV m2
r + λ2 + λ1 + λj
(27)




Eq.(27) states that is the condition that the UC firm’s project value converges to what is similar
to an unconstrained duopoly in a homogeneous duopoly, if the FC duopoly has a high level of
cash flows from its AIP. There are two variations as a result of the FC firm’s AIP cash flows jump
process: we have λjV m2 in the annuity term, and λj in the discount rate. This is because such
a jump terminates the FC firm’s project, and effectively changes the duopoly to a UC monopoly.
Eq.(28) is a valuematching condition that theUCfirm recovers itsmonopolistic project valuewhen
the FC rival abandons the project. Solving V2 yields Equation (12) in the proposition, provided that
X1 = R1.
The case with with costly external financing in Section 4
The HJB equation Equation (14) is a linear second-order ODE. Similar to Liu and Loewenstein
(2002), we follow Boyce and DiPrima (2000) to get its solution.14 If the functions p,q and g are
continuous on an open interval I, and if the functions y1 and y2 are linearly independent solutions
of the homogeneous equation y” + p(t)y′ + q(t)y = 0 corresponding to the non-homogeneous
equation y” + p(t)y′ + q(t)y = g(t), then a particular solution of the non-homogeneous equation
is















1y2. The general solution for Equation (14) is
V (X) = c1X
α1 + c2X
α2 + Vp(X)























Let’s set both of the lower bounds at the convenience levelXCEF , i.e. t∗1 = t∗2 = XCEF .
Rewrite V (X) by plugging the particular solution of Equation (29), substituting t∗1 and t∗2 in the
general solution, and sorting the terms:


















V (XCEF ) = 0 (value matching) (32)
dV (X)
dX
|X=XCEF = 0 (smooth pasting). (33)
14Theorem 3.7.1. in the 12th edition of the book.
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The first boundary condition gives us that the coefficient associated with term Xα2 is zero





dt has a finite limit. If g is a polynomial as
assumed in the extended model, consisting the highest degree of h, then a sufficient condition for







We need to verify that c2 satisfies the first boundary condition. By plugging the expression of c2
into V (X) in Equation (30) and taking its limit, we can get
lim
X→∞






































By L’Hopital’s Rule and provided that α1α2 = −
2(r + λd)
σ2
, the first boundary condition is verified:
lim
X→∞



















The second boundary condition gives the solution for c1:




CEF = 0⇒ c1 = −c2X
α2−α1
CEF
And the third condition leads to the condition:





α1 2(R+ g(X)− λdu)
(α2 − α1)Xα1+1σ2
+Xα2CEF
2(R+ g(XCEF )− λdu)
(α2 − α1)Xα2+1CEF σ2
⇒ c2(−α1 + α2)Xα2−1CEF = 0 (36)
Notice that this is not an optimality condition. To verifyXCEF is the optimal strategy, we need to
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Equation (36) suggests two possible solutions: one is XCEF = 0 and the other is c2 = 0. The
first solution is not sensible given we haven’t imposed any restriction on the cost function g. The











dt = 0. (37)
This indicates that the threshold should be a function of the investment scale, i.e. XCEF (R), and
a zero-NPV kind of stopping rule. Because both c1 and c2 equal zero, the project value before
success and abandonment (from Equation (30)) is











































































[R−α2+2 −X−α2+2CEF ] = 0. (41)
From Equation (39),R+g(XCEF )−λdu > 0 because g(X) is decreasing inX and is bounded from
above. This shows that with costly financing being possible, firms are willing to endure a negative
expected cash flow at times. After we solve for X from Equation (41) as a function of R, we can
find the optimal investment R by maximizing Equation (38).
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Appendix B. Additional Figures
Figure A.1—A.4 show comparative statics of equilibrium investment scales and project values
in a heterogeneous duopoly, with baseline parameters listed in Table 1. RUC,opponent denotes a
UC duopoly’s investment level in equilibrium as a function of its opponent’s parameter. RFC,self
denotes an FC duopoly’s investment level in equilibrium as a function of a parameter of itself.
Other notations are similar.
Figure A.1 – RUC and RFC on AIP Parameters in a Heterogeneous Duopoly
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Figure A.2 – RUC and RFC on Project Parameters in a Heterogeneous Duopoly
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Figure A.3 – VUC and VFC on AIP parameters in a Heterogeneous Duopoly
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Figure A.4 – VUC and VFC on Project Parameters in a Heterogeneous Duopoly
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